

INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT Statements of Felix de VEJARANO

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SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

1. Felix de VEJARANO was scheduled to leave Lisbon for Paris on 22 July 1950. After three or four weeks abroad he reportedly plans to return to Lisbon for a short while before departing for the United States.
2. According to a statement made by VEJARANO while in Lisbon, he himself did not confer with Secretary of State ACHESON\* while the latter was in London. The only person who did talk to ACHESON was J. OLDENBROEK, Secretary General of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The latter, according to VEJARANO, told ACHESON the results of a meeting of the directive body of the ICFTU which was held in Rome in January and at which time a resolution was passed condemning FRANCO's treatment of labor. OLDENBROEK, as Belgian delegate to the direction of the International Transport Union, has been prominent for years in international labor circles. According to VEJARANO, OLDENBROEK is a close friend of British Prime Minister BEVIN and Trifon GOMEZ, the latter considering him as one of his closest friends, both professionally and socially.
3. VEJARANO stated that while in Paris he intended to urge Trifon GOMEZ to accompany him to Brussels in order to confer with OLDENBROEK. The purpose of the conference, as stated by VEJARANO, would be to try to persuade OLDENBROEK to go to Rome to advise the Pope about the background of the conversations OLDENBROEK held with ACHESON, including the latter's reaction to OLDENBROEK's ideas.
4. The following information on the recent activities of VEJARANO and Trifon GOMEZ is based on further statements made by VEJARANO in Lisbon in mid-July 1950.
5. There will be no signed agreement between the Spanish Monarchists and the non-Communist Left, according to VEJARANO.\*\* A "gentlemen's agreement" between these elements has been reached and is constantly being implemented by the appearance of Trifon GOMEZ and VEJARANO in all places where evidences of that agreement are useful or necessary. VEJARANO

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admitted that there has been a difference of opinion between himself and Pedro SAINZ RODRIGUEZ on this point, the latter believing that the agreement should be written and signed in order to be effective. In VEJARANO's opinion a signed evidence would do more harm than good. VEJARANO did not further clarify this last statement but said that his views have prevailed over those of SAINZ RODRIGUEZ.

6. In connection with the conversations held in London and Paris in May 1950 with foreign officials,\*\*\* VEJARANO stated that he and Trifon GOMEZ had conferred with the following:

In London: Mr. YOUNG (fnu) of the British Foreign Office  
Ernest DAVIES

Frances WILLIS of the American Embassy

Ambassador MASSIGLI of the French Embassy  
Claude LEBEL

In Paris: Charles BOHLEN of the American Embassy

Geoffroy de LA TOUR DU PIN of the French Foreign Office

M. GASSOLA, not further identified.

7. The object of the visit to London, according to VEJARANO, was threefold:
- To take advantage of the opportunity offered by the meeting of members of the Atlantic community to stress again that the Monarchists and Spanish anti-Communist labor organizations would, if they were placed at the head of Spanish affairs, fully support the policy of Atlantic solidarity, as carried out by the Western Powers since President TRUMAN's pronouncement on Greece in March 1947.
  - To show that the agreement between the socialists and monarchists was an actual reality, since fully accredited monarchist and socialist representatives were prepared to act together. According to VEJARANO, this was an important point in view of the skepticism shown by many State Department and Foreign Office officials in their conversations with the Socialists in 1949.
  - To inform the western governments that if the Vatican were sure that an attempt to replace General FRANCO would not lead to a civil war and might help to bring Spain immediately into the western community, the Pope would seriously consider bringing moral pressure to bear upon General FRANCO in order to induce him to step aside.
8. The atmosphere in which the conversations took place was described by VEJARANO as having been very friendly, although a certain amount of skepticism was evident, particularly regarding the possibility of papal intervention. VEJARANO interpreted this skepticism as actually concern lest "we (the Monarchists and Socialists) should be nourishing too many illusions."
9. Whenever the question was raised during the conversations as to the kind of government which should or would take FRANCO's place, the Spaniards would not commit themselves. However, according to VEJARANO, Trifon GOMEZ would invariably respond with a statement to the effect that the Spanish anti-Communist syndicates would not press whoever takes General FRANCO's place to hold an election immediately. The successor of General

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FRANCO would enjoy a margin of confidence covering a period of three or four years during which time this alternative government would be in a position to bring about that gradual restoration of fundamental freedoms outlined by Secretary of State ACHESON in his letter to various U.S. senators in January 1950. According to VEJARANO, Trifon GOMEZ also referred to a statement made by OLDENBROEK to American Secretary of State ACHESON on 31 March 1950 that the anti-Communist syndicates throughout the world would oppose any kind of economic and financial assistance to Spain under General FRANCO. Such opposition, Trifon GOMEZ reportedly emphasized, would cease the moment General FRANCO stepped aside.

10. VEJARANO stated that he himself, during the conversations, stressed the importance of the Pope's desire to consider the possibility of intervention, but added that an assurance of immediate financial support from the United States was indispensable.\*\*\* VEJARANO further stated that the Socialists have not linked themselves with any particular form of government to replace General FRANCO but that they are prepared to support whoever is able to oust General FRANCO from his present position, provided this development is followed by gradual restoration of fundamental freedoms.
11. As a result of these conversations Trifon GOMEZ and VEJARANO, according to the latter, received the definite impression that their efforts had contributed something to remove both the fear about the future of Spain in the event of General FRANCO's replacement and the fear that there was no alternative to the present regime.

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